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The strategy of preemption in U.S. counterproliferation policy is a controversial 
issue.  As a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 
September 2001, the Bush administration deemed that the problems associated with the 
global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were grave to continue 
efforts in traditional nonproliferation methods.  Historically, WMD has been considered a 
weapon of last resort, but they are now according to the National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, "militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome 
our nation's advantages in conventional forces and to deter us form responding to 
aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest."1  While there have 
been successes in countering WMD proliferation via foreign diplomacy, international 
treaties, technology interdiction, and traditional nuclear deterrence, these nonproliferation 
methods have proved ineffective in addressing the world’s primary proliferators; global 
terrorists, Iran, North Korea, and previously Iraq.  The new strategy asserts "terrorist 
groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of 
our people and those of our friends and allies—without compunction and without 
warning."2  The Bush administration believes that preemptive military action is a viable 
solution to the proliferation problem.  The strategy of preemption encompasses not only 
preventive strikes against WMD targets, but also preventive war and the interdiction of 
WMD or dual-use materials.  The controversy surrounding preventive war, preemption, 
and interdiction is primarily driven by the practicality, legality, and ethical implications 
of their use against adversaries of the United States.  Preemptive military action requires 
careful consideration and planning and cannot be ordered against all adversaries 
attempting to acquire WMD.  There have been, however, some successful instances 
where preemptive action has attained the desired result – the destruction or delay of a 
state’s WMD program.   
                                                 
1 The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 1. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
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 This paper will examine historical cases where preemptive or preventive action 
was or was not taken. Questions to be analyzed are, why those decisions were made, what 
the effects they had on policy making and counterproliferation efforts, and evaluate if 
preemptive action is an effective tool in U.S. counterproliferation policy.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Bush administration used aggressive rhetoric in public addresses to dissuade 
terrorists and rogue states from acquiring and using WMD, and specifically ordered a 
preventive war against Iraq to address its nuclear, chemical, biological programs.  
Published documents since the 11 September attacks reveal the Bush administration’s 
lack of tolerance for ineffective nonproliferation policies and treaties that have failed to 
achieve the intended results.  In the introduction of the National Security Strategy, 
President George W. Bush explained that inaction was no longer an option and how U.S. 
counterproliferation strategy was about to change: 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so 
with determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to 
succeed … History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger 
but failed to act.  In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace 
and security is the path of action.3 
Three pillars comprise the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction:  counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to 
combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use.  
Such enhancements include, diplomatic interactions with friendly and adversary nations, 
strengthened arms control methods of nations seeking nuclear capabilities, engagement in 
multilateral agreements, offers of threat reduction assistance to neighboring nations, and 
tightened export control from existing nuclear states. 
The document also entails the application of interdiction, deterrence, defense and 
mitigation in counterproliferation efforts.   “U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian 
agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including 
                                                 
3 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002, 1. 
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in appropriate cases through preemptive measures.”4  The purpose of the document is to 
endorse preemption as an effective last resort when all traditional non-military and 
diplomatic methods have failed.  A counter-theory suggests that the “administration’s 
new doctrine is largely designed for domestic consumption and is unlikely to be fully 
implemented because of various normative and practical constraints created by 
international institutions and politics.”5   
 Addressing questions of whether preemptive action is feasible and whether it has 
potential for operational success is the first priority of consideration, but reviewing what 
long-term effects may occur from an offensive preemptive attack or interdiction is also 
important.  The implications of engaging in preemptive action involve international law, 
foreign diplomacy and relations, and the role of the United States as the only global 
superpower.  Examining theoretical questions will help judge the effectiveness of 
preemptive action.  Determining the effects from historical cases of preemptive action 
may assist in estimating the proper course of action to address current and future WMD 
threats.   
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
 Countering WMD proliferation is a top U.S. national security interest.  How 
preemption, preventive war, and interdiction, are used within the guidelines of operation 
plans to counter nuclear proliferation have great implications on U.S. security issues.  
Preemptive action can have multiple interpretations of how, when, and under what 
circumstances it is ordered.  Therefore, the precise definitions of preemption, prevention, 
and interdiction are required.  
 By definition, to preempt is to prevent something from happening or taking 
place.6  However, the policy perspective states that it “is nothing more than a quick draw.  
Upon detecting evidence that an opponent is about to attack, one beats the opponent to 
the punch and attacks first to blunt the impending strike.”7  For the purposes of this 
                                                 
4 The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 3. 
5 James Wirtz and James Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 10, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 113. 
6 Definition taken from Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, 1993. 
7 Wirtz and Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption,” 116. 
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paper, the term preemption will imply that the foreign WMD threat perceived by a state is 
serious enough to remove the threat by military force before it becomes operationally 
employed.  Preventive war is based on the idea that war is inevitable, and that it is better 
to engage while the costs of war are low rather than high, which means that it is better to 
attack an adversary before it has the capability of using WMD in retaliation.8  Besides 
destroying a state’s WMD capabilities, this type of action can, in certain circumstances, 
remove the regime in power.  Preventive strikes against individual targets associated with 
an adversary’s WMD program are separate from the concept of preventive war.  
Preventive strikes are used specifically in the counterproliferation context to dismantle or 
disrupt a state’s ability to advance its WMD program before it becomes an immediate 
threat.  Interdiction of technology and materials related to nuclear programs offers the 
least destructive course of preemptive action.  It targets the sharing of materials and 
information before they become operational and before combat operations are needed.  
Due to intelligence gaps, preparation and response times, legal issues of intercepting dual 
use technologies, and the intricacies of maritime law, using interdiction as a 
counterproliferation tool faces many challenges in implementation. 
 Preemptive force is typically associated with the overt use of military power. 
Covert actions by military and intelligence personnel are in some cases considered part of 
more extensive military actions and political goals.  While covert action could be 
interpreted as a tool of preemption, the intent and outcomes of such actions are classified, 
and are therefore not included in the analysis of this paper.  
 The method of preemption is a component of a larger, broader 
counterproliferation strategy.  Preemptive and preventive military action can only be used 
in very specific situations and cannot apply to all states attempting to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  The preventive war strategy used against Iraq in 2003 may not necessarily be 
successful in curbing North Korea or Iran’s nuclear programs.  Analyzing historical 
events where preemption has or has not taken place against rogue WMD programs, could 
offer insight as to the potential effectiveness of the strategy against future nuclear threats. 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 116.  
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D. ORGANIZATION 
 Evaluating the costs and benefits of preemption can only be determined on an 
individual case basis.  This thesis reviews three tools of U.S. counterproliferation 
strategy: preventive war, preventive strikes, and interdiction. Each chapter examines 
cases where preventive action was or was not ordered, why a particular course of action 
was taken, what effects the action had on policy-making, and what lessons were learned 
from the situation.   
 Chapter II reviews the use of preventive war as a counterproliferation tool and its 
potential for regime change.  Two specific cases involving preventive war are examined: 
the Soviet Union after the Second World War and Iraq in Operation Enduring Freedom.  
The events that followed the end of the Second World War and the subsequent rise of the 
USSR as a nuclear power made a credible case for preventive war, but U.S. political 
influences led to the implementation of the containment strategy. The United States 
engaged in its first preventive war in 2003 against Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime.  
The political, diplomatic, and legal implications surrounding the initial invasion through 
the close of combat operations serves as a basis for determining Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’s successes and failures. 
 The third chapter analyzes historical cases of preventive strikes against 
adversarial nuclear programs.  These cases include, the Allied attack on the German held 
Norsk-Hydro heavy water plant in Norway during the Second World War, the Israeli 
attack on Iraq’s nuclear plant Osirak in 1981, and the proposed plan to strike the Lop Nur 
nuclear plant in China during the early days of the Johnson administration.  Analysis of 
the case studies in this chapter concludes that preventive strikes, in the right 
circumstances, are an effective counterproliferation method. 
Chapter IV examines the legal and operational challenges associated with 
interdiction, specifically maritime intercept operations (MIO) and international regulation 
of dual use technologies. The North Korean missile delivery to Yemen in 2002 serves as 
the case study for interdiction and examination of the future role of the newly organized 
Proliferation Security Initiative indicates the importance of interdiction to the world 
6 
community.  Although the case study examined in the chapter was not a complete 
success, it demonstrated the potential utility of interdiction as a counterproliferation tool.  
Chapter V offers conclusions about the effectiveness of preemptive and 
preventive tactics in counterproliferation strategy and identifies the challenges facing 
U.S. foreign policies and national security interest around the globe.  Suggestions and 
recommendations for future courses of action against present and future threats are also 
reviewed. 
7 
II. PREVENTIVE WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION TO PREVENTIVE WAR 
When Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 19 March 2003, the United States had 
never engaged in a preventive war against another state.9  Using preventive war as a 
strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction, more specifically nuclear weapons, 
development and proliferation is a delicate issue.  Multiple considerations must be 
addressed before engaging in an attack, but the most important to answer is that all 
nonmilitary means of action, to include diplomatic intervention and negotiations, have 
been attempted to alleviate the threat.  At the theoretical level, “preventive war is a 
possible strategy for democratic states if the expected costs are low, if the state has allies 
that might reduce these costs through diplomatic or military action, and if the state has 
few viable alternatives for dealing with relative decline.”10  Therefore, the use of 
preventive war as a tool for counterproliferation is only possible prior to the adversary 
gaining nuclear weapons, and initiating a winnable war before less favorable 
circumstances arise.  Since WMD programs are initiated and directed by the regime in 
power, preventive war can often require removal of that regime in order to fully destroy 
the threat.   
Two case studies of U.S. strategic considerations for preventive war are examined 
in this chapter: the Soviet Union and Iraq.   Differing political circumstances and the 
application of alternate strategies towards each state, supports the theory that preventive 
action cannot be applied to states, such as North Korea and Iran, who are aggressively 
seeking nuclear weapon capabilities.  
B. CASE STUDY 1: THE SOVIET UNION  
1. Early Considerations of Preventive War 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, U.S. officials and their 
British allies argued that the growing threat from the Soviet Union was justification for 
                                                 
9 Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force,” Congressional Research Service 
document RS21311, 18 September 2002, 1. 
10 Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, “Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign,” Security Studies 11, no. 2 (winter 2001/2): 4. 
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the implementation of a preventive war.11  After careful consideration, the Truman 
administration chose not to engage in preventive war and implemented a containment 
strategy towards the Soviet Union.   
 In January 1946, soon after the close of the Second World War, General Leslie 
Groves, the wartime commander of the Manhattan Project, put forth a memorandum 
concerning the military implications of the atomic bomb:   
If we were ruthlessly realistic, we would not permit any foreign power 
with which we are not firmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute 
confidence, to make or possess atomic weapons.  If such as country started 
to make atomic weapons we would destroy its capability to make them 
before it had progressed far enough to threaten us.12  
 The dangers of nuclear proliferation arose almost immediately after the United 
States successfully detonated its first nuclear device.  The race throughout the Second 
World War as to who could make the atom bomb first had a stronger hold on the civilian 
and military leaders of the combatant nations than debate as to whether or not they should 
create such a powerful and devastating weapon. Once the bomb was completed, the 
question of ‘what to do now?’ was at the forefront of the debate.  Within a few short 
years, the technology of the atom bomb would spread to other states and create a new 
challenge to domestic and international security. 
Although more than fifty years have passed since General Groves made his 
statement on the need for preemptive action, the same perspectives were echoed by 
proponents for the Iraq war in 2003.  The concept of preventive war was contemplated by 
U.S. administrations against the Soviet Union, China, Iraq, and possibly other rogue 
states developing nuclear programs.  The question of whether or not to employ such 
action is contingent on the circumstances associated with the enemy state, and what post-
war consequences would affect each side.  Engaging in preventive war in a nuclear 
environment requires extensive planning and preparedness for the potential response 
                                                 
11 Marc Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-
1954,” International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988/89): 9-10. 
12 Cited in Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset,” 5. 
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from the adversary.  How to handle Soviet aggression in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
became a difficult question to answer. 
Strategic theories regarding contending points of view on how to address the 
Soviet threat varied among government officials and civilian analysts.  Fearing the Soviet 
development of a usable nuclear weapon, nuclear scientists, civilian analysts at the 
RAND Corporation, U.S. Naval strategists, and some State Department representatives, 
believed a preventive war against the Soviets was the only solution to the threat.13  
Preventive war proponents encouraged the United States to take a much more active and 
aggressive policy in preventing the Soviet Union from acquiring nuclear weapons.  
Political and military officials were well aware that there was no way to tell what would 
happen if the Soviets developed their own nuclear arsenal.  Even Winston Churchill 
privately urged the American government to present the Soviets with an ultimatum: “if 
they do not retire from Berlin and abandon Eastern Germany … we will raze their cities 
…we cannot appease, conciliate, or provoke the Soviet; the only vocabulary they 
understand is the use of force; and if, therefore, we took this position, they would 
yield.”14  He went on to say that “we ought not to wait until Russia is ready” and deemed 
that a preventive first strike would be the “best chance of coming out of [the war] 
alive.”15  This push from Great Britain created even more tension on how to deal with 
Soviet aggression and encroachment upon Eastern Europe.  The threat of a nuclear-armed 
Soviet Union generated fear throughout Western Europe, and the United States knew it 
was the only other power at the time capable of curtailing its actions. 
 Soviet doctrine dictated that a complacent relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the United States would deteriorate to hostile antagonism.  George Kennan, U.S. 
diplomat to the USSR during the Harry S. Truman administration, stated there could 
never be “on Moscow’s side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the 
Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist.  It must be invariably assumed 
in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and 
                                                 
13 Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset,” 8-9. 
14 Lewis Douglas personal message to Robert Lovett, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 17 April 1948, Vol. II, 895. 
15 Cited in Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset,” 9. 
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therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls.”16  Therefore, any peaceful resolution 
to differences between the Soviet Union and United States had to take place before the 
Soviets gained nuclear weapons. 
2. The Choice of Containment 
 Given the Soviet strategic influence over Eastern Europe and the growing strength 
of their military, a nuclear-capable Soviet Union was a global concern.  Any attack by the 
Soviets would specifically threaten Western Europe and deployed American forces in the 
region.  Therefore the encouragement from Great Britain was not enough justification 
enough to initiate a preventive war with the Soviets.  Additionally, it was understood that 
the behavior of the Kremlin: its secretiveness, deception, and lack of honesty when 
conducting foreign policy could not be changed and that minor concessions should not be 
misconstrued as appeasement and willingness to cooperate.   The nature of Soviet 
diplomacy “makes it more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual 
sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong … [however,] it 
cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its 
opponents.”17  The Soviets were far too wary of U.S. intentions to concede any of their 
power and therefore diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union 
would be useless in alleviating the nuclear threat. 
 George Kennan argued that given the circumstances and the nature of the enemy, 
“the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a 
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” 
And that the United States should enter “with reasonable confidence upon a policy of 
firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at 
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and 
stable world.”18  These statements were part of a telegram he sent from Moscow in 1947, 
well before the Soviets detonated their first nuclear bomb.  This was the first decisive, yet 
cautious proposal on how to deal with the Soviet threat. With internal and external 
                                                 
16 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conflict,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947): 572. 
17 Ibid., 572. 
18 Ibid., 581. 
11 
pressure on the administration to engage in preemptive action, someone with connections 
to the Soviet political and diplomatic spheres suggested a counter-strategy to destroy the 
enemy - containment.  The influence of Kennan’s telegram, which was later published as 
“The Sources of Soviet Conflict” in the journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym 
‘X’, reached far across U.S. foreign policy decision-making and eventually found its way 
into formal U.S. security doctrine.   
 In 1950 the National Security Council, under the direction of Paul Nitze, Director 
of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, published the official U.S. 
strategy on containment: NSC-68.  Throughout the document, the basis of many 
conclusions made about the Soviet Union and its intentions could be traced back to the 
determinations made by George Kennan three years earlier.  The validity of NSC 68 
became more widespread than a mere statement declared by the National Security 
Council.  The directive depicted the nature of the international crisis developing at the 
time, characterized Soviet intentions and capabilities, and itemized the objectives of the 
United States and the means in which to accomplish them.  Within NSC-68, preventive 
war “is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an 
attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war 
and perhaps to win an early decision.”19  The goal of any preventive war is to strike 
quickly and inflict enough damage to prevent a similar retaliatory response.  Within the 
context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, however, this kind of attack could only be 
initiated with nuclear weapons. 
 The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations in 
now limited to attack with atomic weapons.  A powerful blow could be delivered 
upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not 
force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able 
to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia.  This would 
probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of 
                                                 
19 NSC 68: A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Security, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States Vol. I, 14 April 1950, 281.  
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Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the 
regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.20 
 Instituting a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union would only strengthen their 
resolve to retaliate against the United States and its allies, and create havoc on the 
European continent.  This was the central paradox of nuclear power that strategists 
contemplated.  Simply striking a nuclear-armed adversary with a nuclear weapon would 
only heighten the stakes of the attack because a nuclear response would be the only 
option to retaliate with.  Therefore, if the preventive war strategy was going to have any 
success it would have had to been initiated prior to the first Soviet nuclear test in August 
1949.   
 It was acknowledged within NSC 68 that not engaging in preventive war was a 
calculable risk. 
The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, 
and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in 
the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us.  It equally puts a 
premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold 
war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the 
improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war.21 
 The risk of future nuclear war was therefore more a more favorable challenge 
than attempting to engage in a preventive war.  “These are risks we will invite by making 
ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid.”22  This 
encompassed not only the nuclear threat from the Soviets, but also the political influence 
of the communist party around the globe.  An attempt to prevent the Soviets from 
obtaining nuclear weapons required the dismantling of the Stalin’s regime.  In 1947, 
George Keenan estimated that the Soviet Union would implode under its own economic 
and government restrictions within fifteen years.23  The main consideration was the 
nuclear threat the Soviets could pose in the near future.  Therefore, no one within the 
Truman administration pushed to wipe out the communist government as part of the 
                                                 
20 NSC 68, 281 
21 Ibid., 264.   
22 Ibid., 265. 
23 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conflict,” 576. 
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preventive war plan.  It would be too costly for the United States to take on the USSR’s 
conventional military and overthrow the communist party at the same time. 
3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
With the notion that a nuclear Soviet Union was years away, geopolitics became 
the decisive factor in the decision not to engage in preventive war.  While the United 
States was fearful of a nuclear-powered Soviet Union, the political implication of 
challenging the communist regime proved to be more costly than the benefit of removing 
their nuclear program by force.  The intelligence failure to accurately estimate the Soviet 
nuclear program contributed to the implementation of the containment strategy.  Once the 
Soviets detonated their first nuclear devise, preventive war was no longer an option.  If 
U.S. officials had precise information when the Soviets would obtain their nuclear 
capabilities, there may have been a greater push for preventive action.  The containment 
strategy was therefore the appropriate strategy to follow given the Soviet nuclear 
capabilities and the challenge of militarily engaging the communist regime.   
 
C. CASE STUDY 2: IRAQ 
1. Background 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom was a significant event that had global repercussions. 
The international community watched as the only global superpower used its military to 
remove the Saddam Hussein regime and an allegedly imminent threat of nuclear weapons 
development.  The United States perceived that Iraq’s WMD programs were active and 
that the threat of a nuclear-armed Iraq constituted a threat that constituted the need for a 
preventive war.  The United States launched the operation with the confidence that it 
could take on Iraq’s military and drive to Baghdad with minimal resistance.  Operation 
Iraqi Freedom marked the first instance where the United States engaged in a preventive 
war against a state’s nuclear program and the regime that supported it.  Before and after 
combat operations concluded in Iraq, the legality, ethics, and necessity of the action was 
debated in both the   United States as well as internationally.  The debate centered on the 
issues of whether preemptive action against Iraq was legal, and whether the potential 
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positive results of the war was worth the growing negative perception of the United 
States by the international community.   
 Many competing theories exist as to the true justification for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Some analysts believe that the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks compelled 
the United States to target all rogue states equally as the members of Al Qaeda.  Another 
theory is that this was merely an extension of the unfinished business left from Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991.  The debate on the necessity of war amongst the United States, its 
allies, and the United Nations (UN) as a whole, reached a stalemate by March 2003. 
According to the Bush administration, the question of whether or not Iraq had resumed its 
WMD programs, as intelligence estimates prior to the war had suggested, could only be 
answered by offensive action.  Inspections conducted by UN personnel following the first 
Gulf War were hindered by the uncooperative Hussein regime, eventually resulting in the 
withdrawal of UN inspectors in 1998.  International pressure backed by the threat of 
force, prompted the Hussein regime to accept UN inspectors again in early 2003, bit the 
new inspection teams met with the same difficulties as their predecessors.  Support for 
UN imposed economic sanctions against Iraq weakened due to their ineffectiveness in 
curbing weapons development and the continued hardships sanctions imposed upon the 
people of Iraq.   
2. The Choice of Preventive War 
 “A legitimate preemptive war requires that states identify that potential aggressors 
have both the capability and the intention of doing great harm to you in the immediate 
future.”24  Prior to the initiation of the invasion of Iraq by U.S. ground forces, the stated 
goal of the attack was to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and 
disrupt any ties or affiliations that the regime had with terrorist organizations.  In order to 
accomplish these tasks, removing Saddam Hussein from power was a necessity, and 
frankly, an added bonus for the world community and the oppressed people of Iraq.  Even 
the name of the mission, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” illustrated a theme of liberation 
rather than an aggressive attack aimed at ridding the country of deadly weapons. 
                                                 
24 Neta C. Crawford, “The Slippery Slope to Preventive War,” Ethics & International Affairs Vol. 13, 
Issue 1, (New York, 2003): 33. 
15 
 Early in the military campaign against the Hussein regime, General Tommy 
Franks, Combatant Commander of U.S Central Command, announced the military 
objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
First, end the regime of Saddam Hussein. Second, to identify, isolate and 
eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Third, to search for, to 
capture, and to drive out terrorists from that country.  Fourth, to collect 
such intelligence we can relate to terrorist networks. Fifth, to collect such 
intelligence as we can relate to the global network of illicit weapons of 
mass destruction.  Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver 
humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needy Iraqi citizens. 
Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi 
people. And last, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition 
to a representative self-government.25 
 The mission objectives of the military at the beginning of the war supported Bush 
administration claims of the immediate necessity of preventive war.  The success of the 
operation depended on the first objective stated by General Franks - the end of the 
Saddam Hussein regime.  While the regime is currently disbanded and inactive, the fact 
that Saddam Hussein himself has not been captured or killed prohibits the U.S. from 
proclaiming a final end to the regime and leads some to speculate that he could return 
with some sort of retaliation against U.S. forces or the people he oppressed for thirty 
years.  Of even greater concern is the fact that little evidence of WMD or their associated 
programs has been publicly released.  Prior to the start of the operation, opponents to the 
war were concerned that substantial WMD evidence would be found, thereby prompting 
many to believe that they did not act in the best interest of U.S. national security.   
 In an attempt to generate international support for preventive action, the Bush 
administration presented its case for war in a way indicating that Iraq’s WMD programs 
were advancing at such a rate, that preventive action was required for global safety.  
Secretary of State Colin Powell cited Iraq’s WMD program and its ties to terrorism as the 
primary rational for preventive war during his statement to the United Nations in 
February 2003. 
                                                 
25 General Tommy R. Franks, Briefing on Military Operations in Iraq, 22 March 2003, 
http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Transcripts/20030322.htm Accessed 2 August 2003. 
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We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass 
destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history 
of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we 
know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact 
revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not 
someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his 
choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to 
respond?  The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the 
American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of 
mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a 
post-September 11th world. 26 
 In the months following the end of major combat operations in Iraq and without 
the proof of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, various cabinet members of 
the Bush administration sought to justify the urgency for attack on other grounds than 
WMD, without reducing its necessity.  In a statement made to Congress on 11 July 2003, 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that, “the coalition did not act in Iraq because we 
had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We 
acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our 
experience on September 11th.”27   If Secretary Rumsfeld made this statement prior to 
the war, additional domestic and international support for the war could have been 
generated.  Government officials gave the impression to the American public and foreign 
allies that new and incriminating evidence about Iraq’s WMD programs existed. They 
often used phrases such as ‘absolute certainty,’ ‘leaves no doubt’ and ‘absolutely’ within 
their speeches.  Justifying the war by linking it to the 11 September terrorist attacks 
directs attention away from the perceived intelligence failures that are still plaguing the 
federal government.   
 National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, also justified the use of force 
without the “new evidence” theory.  She stated that: 
judgments by the intelligence community indicated that [Saddam Hussein] 
was reconstituting his programs, that he had an active procurement 
network, that he was gathering together nuclear scientists, that he had 
                                                 
26 Colin Powell, “Iraq's Failure to Disarm,” Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, 5 February 
2003. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm. Accessed 10 September 2003.  
27 Donald Rumsfeld, from the hearing on “The lessons learned during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Federal News Service, 9 July 2003. 
17 
several designs for a nuclear weapon, and that left unchecked he might be 
able to have a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade. …five of the six 
intelligence agencies believed that he had an active program of 
reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. …at the end of the Gulf 
War, [Iraq had] been proven to be much closer to a nuclear weapon than 
the International Atomic Energy Agency had thought. He had been 
seeking nuclear weapons for a long time. This didn't happen in a 
vacuum.28   
 This statement can be interpreted as a push for war because all of the other 
methods (Operation Desert Storm, seventeen UN Security Resolutions, economic 
sanctions, UN weapons inspections, and the threat of invasion) to contain Saddam 
Hussein failed, therefore, initiating a preventive war was the only option left to remove 
the impending threat. 
a.  The Legality and Justification of War 
 One view of strategic theory states when a “rising state crosses a critical threshold 
of capabilities, such as the development of nuclear capability,” there exists a legitimate 
case for preventive war.29  The Bush administration insisted on immediate action to 
prevent Saddam Hussein from developing a usable nuclear weapon.  Many in the global 
community, however, resisted the pressure to follow the preemptive lead of the United 
States. As examined in the Soviet Union case, most of the world already feared a nuclear 
powered Soviet Union and encouraged U.S. intervention. In the case of Iraq, however, 
the United States was clearly increasing its readiness for war even before U.S. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell attempted to recruit various allies in the preventive war effort.  The 
UN remained cautious regarding the true intentions of the United States and encouraged 
further weapons inspections to determine Iraq’s true nuclear potential.  By not obtaining a 
specific UN Security Council resolution authorizing a preventive war against Iraq, and 
with little help from many long-standing allies, the legality of the preventive war 
remained uncertain. 
                                                 
28 Condoleezza Rice, from “Newsmaker: Condoleezza Rice,” PBS Online News Hour, 30 July 2003.  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec03/rice_7-30.html Accessed 2 August 2003. 
29 Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, “Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign,” Security Studies 11, no. 2 (winter 2001/2): 8. 
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 The legality of using military force in anticipatory self-defense involves the 
interpretation of international law and the influence of treaties and agreements on 
international law.  For centuries, international law recognized that nations did not have to 
suffer an attack before they could lawfully take action against forces threatening 
imminent attack.  Since the development of the United Nations and its efforts to bring 
global cooperation between its members, limitations have been placed on individual 
member state action.  According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, states shall maintain the 
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security.”30  The charter also stipulates that the 
Security Council maintains authority over states that act without authorization.  Thus, a 
member of the United Nations can engage in self-defensive military action only after an 
attack has happened, and then only until the Security Council decides how to respond 
appropriately.  Under these guidelines, unilateral preventive or preemptive force with or 
without an imminent threat is unlawful, and an attack on Iraq would be considered illegal 
by international law standards unless pre-approved by the Security Council. 
 “In today’s world of nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
terrorism, a less precise definition of a potential threat justifying military action under the 
rule permitting anticipatory self-defense is appropriate.”31  The changing nature of 
aggression and threat response is viewed differently since the end of the Cold War.  Both 
WMD and terrorism pose threats unanticipated by traditional international law.  The main 
purpose of the UN Charter was to address conventional threats posed by rational state 
actors.  Reliance on the old and dated methods of deterrence and containment no longer 
work to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  If the Charter is deemed 
out-dated concerning preventive war and preemption against WMD threats, then the Bush 
doctrine of preventive war is in fact lawful.   
                                                 
30 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 7, Article 51, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ Accessed 
on 2 August 2003. 
31 Thomas Graham Jr., “National Self-defense, International law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (Chicago: Spring 2003): 1 
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 Since the creation of the UN, many historical cases of the use of force in violation 
of the UN Charter’s basic paradigm exist.  Although not an all-inclusive list, the 
following actions are examples of military operations not conducted in self-defense that 
failed to receive UN Security Council authorization, but challenged political and 
territorial integrity and independence.   
- North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950) 
- U.S. actions in Guatemala (1954) 
- Israeli, French, and British invasion of Egypt (1956) 
- Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) 
- U.S. sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) 
- Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) 
- North Vietnamese actions against South Vietnam (1960-1975) 
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) 
- U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983) 
- U.S. invasion of Panama (1989) 
- Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990) 
- NATO/U.S. actions against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation 
(1999)32 
 Given that each of these actions were in violation of the UN Charter, it is difficult 
to determine the influence and control the Charter still has over state action and use of 
force.  Therefore, if the UN Charter cannot control individual state action, it cannot truly 
reflect international laws and norms and the Bush strategy of preventive war and 
preemption is therefore legal.33  
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3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
 The full implications of the preventive war against Iraq are still unknown.  The 
exact amount of damage done to U.S. credibility over the failure to immediately identify 
the location of WMD materials in Iraq remains undetermined. While the UN tries to find 
a niche in the effort to rebuild Iraq, the United States maintains control over the ongoing 
military operations.  There is no question that Iraq is better off without the dictatorial 
regime of Saddam Hussein, but U.S. troops and officials within Iraq have yet to release 
conclusive evidence to justify the original claims for war. Sufficient proof of Iraq’s 
WMD program may never be available to satisfy the administration’s critics.  The United 
States and its coalition partners fought a preventive war against Iraq, but it has yet to be 
proven, or at least released to the American public and international community what 
specifically the United States tried to prevent; an impending WMD attack from Saddam 
Hussein, proliferation of WMD to a terrorist group, or the technology development 
required for future nuclear weapons.   
 In theory, “to be an effective treatment for proliferation, preventive war must not 
only remove the direct threat, but also dissuade would-be proliferators.”34  With regards 
to Iraq, the United States has removed the direct threat - Saddam Hussein - but the effect 
the preventive war has had on would-be proliferators is unknown.  There is speculation 
that Operation Iraqi Freedom sought to challenge the WMD programs in North Korea 
and Iran.  It is possible in fact, that the preemption doctrine adopted by the United States 
may actually increase international instability “because it is coupled with the U.S. goal of 
maintaining global preeminence and a military force ‘beyond challenge’.”35  Both North 
Korea, and Iran, however, continue to actively pursue their respective nuclear programs. 
Although the U.S. military clearly has the capability to defeat North Korea or Iran, such 
an operation would be more difficult than Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Instituting a 
preventive war against either of these states would be subject to negative criticisms from 
the international community and the task of removing Kim Jong Il in North Korea or the 
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fundamentalist mullahs in Iran would have more political ramifications globally than the 
elimination of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. 
D. CONCLUSIONS ON PREVENTIVE WAR 
 The case studies of the Soviet Union and Iraq described in this chapter indicate 
that preventive war is not always a prescription for countering the proliferation of WMD.  
Geopolitical circumstances and the immediacy of the threat dictate what course of action 
should be chosen.  Preventive war should only be ordered by the United States when 
precise intelligence indicates an adversary’s program is a direct threat against U.S. 
national security.  What was prescribed for one country (Iraq) may not work against other 
uncooperative states, such as Iran and North Korea.   
 The decision not to engage in a preventive war can lead to an adversary acquiring 
deadly WMD capabilities.  Even though the United States never followed through with 
its preventive war plans against the Soviet Union, the following thirty years of 
containment gave rise to a nuclear arms race that strained relations throughout the world. 
Although the offensive phase of the Iraq war was successful in removing the Saddam 
Hussein regime from power, securing a new Iraq and instituting a new government 
remain the challenges ahead.  The role of preventive war within counterproliferation 
strategy is limited.  Strained relations between the United States, its allies and the United 
Nations during the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom proved that preventive war is not 
internationally regarded as a legitimate counterproliferation strategy.  If the United 
States, however, succeeds in building a stable Iraq, and the benefits of a non-nuclear, free 
Iraqi society outweigh the costs the United States paid in waging the war, then the 
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III. PREVENTIVE STRIKES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
 There is a distinct difference between preemptive and preventive strikes when 
used as a method of counterproliferation.  A preemptive strike is conducted when another 
state threatens an imminent attack with weapons of mass destruction, and the only way to 
protect national security is to strike first.  Preventive strikes, on the other hand, are used 
to dismantle or disrupt a state’s WMD program before a usable weapon is completed.  
Popular media tends to interchange these two terms, but each are independent tactics 
within the broader strategy of counterproliferation.  What distinguishes preemptive and 
preventive strikes from preventive war is that strikes are not intended to dismantle the 
government or challenge the power of the leadership, only to destroy facilities that 
produce or deploy WMD.  This chapter analyzes historical cases of preventive strikes and 
examines the usefulness of preventive strikes in countering nuclear proliferation. 
 The examined case studies are: the allied attacks on the German held heavy water 
plant in Norway during the Second World War, the Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear 
plant at Osirak in 1981, and the contemplation of the Johnson administration to conduct 
preventive strikes against China’s Lop Nur nuclear plant in 1963.  While there are other 
examples of preventive strikes involving weapons of mass destruction during the 
twentieth century, the proposed case studies offer different solutions to nuclear 
counterproliferation and are valuable for comparison.  The attack on the Norsk-Hydro 
plant was the first preventive strike against another state’s nuclear program, the U.S. 
decision not to attack China’s developing nuclear program was a calculated risk and a 
missed opportunity to disrupt China’s nuclear efforts, and Israel’s attack on Osirak 
postponed Iraq’s ability to obtain the materials needed to develop a usable weapon for at 
least 20 years.  
 Similar to engaging in a preventive war, preventive strikes require a state to 
examine the WMD threat from the adversary and address the viability of a planned 
operation and evaluate its potential for success.  According to author Barry Schneider, the 
United States should address each of the questions regarding the immediate intentions of 
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the adversary, the potential for a successful attack, and the political ramifications of a 
surprise attack.36  All of these issues rely heavily on accurate intelligence to determine if 
a preventive strike would effectively achieve the goal of destroying or disrupting an 
adversary’s WMD programs.    
B. CASE STUDY 1: NORSK HEAVY WATER PLANT 
1. Background 
 Nazi Germany’s attempts to develop a usable nuclear weapon were a major 
concern to the Allied powers during the Second World War.  American and British 
nuclear physicists feared that they had fallen behind their German counterparts and that 
Germany would develop an atomic bomb first.  This perception was a result of multiple 
considerations. 
- The high caliber of German theoretical and experimental physicists 
- German control of Europe’s only uranium mine (in Czechoslovakia) 
- German control of the world’s largest supply of imported uranium in 
Belgium 
- German possession of Europe’s only cyclotron in France 
- German control of the world’s only commercial source of heavy water in 
Norway.37 
 By 1942 the United States and Germany had equivalent levels of technology in 
the race to develop a nuclear bomb.  It was determined that same year by Arthur H. 
Compton, Director of Atomic Research at the University of Chicago, that “if the 
Germans know what we know – we dare not discount their knowledge – they should be 
dropping fission bombs on us in 1943, a year before [U.S.] bombs are planned to be 
ready.”38  Compton later advised General Leslie Groves, Director of the Manhattan 
Project, that the United States must obtain complete domination of Germany before June 
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1943, destroy German fission plants by sabotage, air or commando raids, and speed the 
U.S. nuclear schedule to beat the Germans.39  The military and scientific communities 
both realized the danger if the Nazis developed an atomic weapon.  Unlike the other case 
studies, the fact that the Allies were already at war with Nazi Germany eliminated the 
political debate over the legality of the preventive strikes. 
 German military forces seized the Norsk-Hydro plant in April 1940, and heavy-
water production rates rose significantly within months.  German scientists concluded 
that heavy water offered the most practical solution to producing an atomic weapon.   
  Heavy water looks and tastes like ordinary water, but it is 
chemically different.  Composed of the hydrogen isotope 
deuterium and oxygen, it has twice as many hydrogen atoms as 
ordinary water and is 10 percent heavier.  The extra weight works 
as a slow-motion mechanism, moderating the speed of the neutrons 
set free in a nuclear reactor and permitting these elementary atomic 
particles to split uranium atoms in a chain reaction and produce 
plutonium, a fissionable element that could be used in a bomb.40   
 Constant aerial and ground attacks on German nuclear instillations between 1941 
and1943 did little to hinder German nuclear research.  A key target in the Allied plan was 
the German-controlled heavy water plant, Norsk-Hydro, at Venmork, Norway.   The 
Allies deemed destroying the plant’s operational capabilities was the best option 
available for crippling the German atomic bomb research effort.   
2. The Decision to Attack 
 After negotiations took place between the United States and Great Britain, the 
Allies decided that the United States would maintain the responsibility of developing the 
nuclear bomb, while the British maintained the responsibility of destroying the German 
nuclear program.41  Analysis determined that attacking German controlled uranium mines 
in Czechoslovakia could not reduce production sufficiently to halt the program, 
moreover, once uranium was mined it was impossible to trace.42  The Norsk-Hydro plant, 
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however, was the sole location of Germany’s heavy-water research and equipment and 
therefore a prime target.  Because of this analysis, British military leaders recommended 
the immediate destruction of the Norsk-Hydro plant.  British led forces conducted four 
separate operations before finally succeeding in destroying the heavy water and related 
production equipment.  
 The first raid tasked British paratroopers to sabotage the plant. The gliders they 
used to infiltrate the enemy-infested area, however, crashed into a mountain as a result of 
inclement weather in October 1942.  The second attempt was made in February 1943, 
when British trained Norwegian saboteurs were able to permeate the buildings within 
Norsk-Hydro, set explosives, and disable the facility.  The success was short lived 
however, as German production resumed at the plant a few months later.  A combined 
effort by the Royal Air Force and the American Eighth Air Force was the third attempt. 
They dropped over 800 1,000-pound and 500-pound bombs combined, but post-strike 
analysis discovered that only two bombs hit the electrolysis plant and the heavy-water 
reactor remained untouched.43  While the aerial bomb attack was an operational failure, it 
forced the Germans to decide the future of their heavy water program.  They determined 
that the plant was too vulnerable for the research to remain in Norway and ordered a 
transfer.  General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, one of the senior officers favored by Hitler, 
announced the construction of a heavy-water plant in Germany and ordered that all the 
heavy water and plant facilities at Norsk-Hydro be shipped across the Baltic Sea to 
Germany by ferry.   
 British intelligence learned the date, time, and route of the heavy water delivery to 
Germany, and determined that sinking the ferry in the deep waters of Lake Tinn was the 
ideal method of destruction.  The transfer was scheduled for Sunday, 20 February, which 
bode well for an attack because there would be few passengers aboard and therefore 
fewer casualties would be inflicted.  Three Norwegians carried out the operation.  The 
men used an alarm clock, electric detonators, and “fashioned nineteen pounds of plastic 
explosives into a twelve-foot-long, sausage shaped bomb.  It was large enough to ensure 
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that the vessel would sink quickly.”44  Several hours later the bomb exploded, destroying 
the heavy-water cargo. 
3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
 The action taken against Germany’s heavy-water research was the first successful 
preventive nuclear operation in history.45  Although the successful completion of the 
mission required four different attacks, the elimination of Germany’s heavy water 
production and research capability damaged its overall nuclear program.  There was little 
political debate over the methods used in the attacks, although the Norwegian 
government objected to the Allied bombing raid because they were not consulted prior to 
the attack and were angry about collateral damage in the area surrounding the plant.  “If 
the aim of this bombing was to stop the production … of heavy water, better results could 
have been achieved by specialized methods of attack than by overall bombing.”46  The 
Allies learned from mistakes and eventually implemented a plan to complete the mission 
with minimal collateral damage. 
 Another factor slowed the progress of the German nuclear program. After a 
German Army review of the Reich’s weapons programs, nuclear research lost its relative 
importance when judged against other technological military endeavors.  In December 
1941, the German military leadership needed to determine which of the following 
programs would most benefit the war effort: jet aircraft, ballistic missiles, or nuclear 
weapons.  The scientists determined that a nuclear bomb was another two to three years 
away (Allied scientists at the time would have made the same estimate), and would do 
little to serve the immediate German war effort.  Leadership interest in the nuclear 
program diminished, while the ballistic missile program rose to top priority in German 
military research.47 
 The conclusion of the Second World War proved that Nazi Germany was further 
from obtaining the technological capabilities needed to build a nuclear weapon than 
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previously thought.  As a result, the attack on the heavy water program proved 
unnecessary, but during the nuclear race between the Allies and Nazis, any attempt to 
prevent the adversary from obtaining an atomic weapon was a justifiable action in the 
wartime environment.   
C. CASE STUDY 2:  ISRAEL’S ATTACK ON OSIRAK 
1. Background 
 Contrary to what is typically written about the Israeli air strike on the Osirak 
reactor in Iraq the mission was not preemptive, but preventive.  Iraq was far from 
reaching nuclear weapons capability at the time of attack, but obtained the appropriate 
machinery and technological information to further its efforts towards a usable weapon.  
The controversy surrounding the attack centered on the fact it was the first occasion 
where a state engaged in a preemptive action against another state’s nuclear program 
without any provocation.  Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin issued the order to 
attack on the basis that he feared that his party would lose the next election, and he did 
not believe the opposition had the fortitude to initiate a preventive action prior to the 
production of the first Iraqi nuclear bomb.  Prime Minister Begin did not want to lose 
what could be the only chance he would have to save the Jewish state from nuclear 
attack. 
 Iraq’s nuclear program began in the 1960s.  Iraq ratified the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) on 29 October 1969 and pledged not to manufacture nuclear weapons and 
agreed to place all its nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards.48  Saddam 
Hussein, while Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, initiated the 
Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.49  Iraq purchased a reactor from France in 
1975 with the intent to use it for civil power purposes, but the fact that they would obtain 
highly enriched uranium in the process generated international concern.  As part of Iraq’s 
agreement with France during the reactor sale, the equipment was subject to international 
inspections under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, and given 
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Iraq’s stature as a signatory of the NPT, no one expected Iraq would attempt covert 
nuclear weapons research.  After an attack by Iran in the early days of the Iran-Iraq war 
in September 1980, however, the official Iraqi news agency issued the following 
statement:  “The Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not 
intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity.”50 This single statement 
indicated not only that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear bomb, but also that Israel was the 
primary the target of the bomb.   
2. The Decision to Attack 
 Israel noted the threat from Iraq, and on 7 June 1981 took preventive action 
against the Iraqi nuclear program and conducted a surprise attack on the Osirak reactor.  
Before the decision to strike was made, Israeli military and civilian leaders debated over 
the timing of the attack, and a dispute over military action versus diplomatic efforts 
ensued between the two major Israeli parties.   The Labor party favored diplomatic 
efforts to head off Iraqi nuclear capability.  It adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy that relied 
upon diplomacy to try to forestall the Iraq effort.  In 1981, Labor leaders believed an 
understanding with then French President Francois Mitterand, had been agreed upon to 
reverse the French policy of helping Iraq in nuclear matters.  Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, leader of the Likud Party, disagreed with this approach.  He did not trust leaving 
this matter to the French, to fate, and certainly not to the reasonableness of Saddam 
Hussein.  He thought military action was the only remedy. 
For Begin, the prospect of an Iraqi nuclear capability, indeed any Arab 
nuclear capability, was totally and irrevocably intolerable.  It was a 
devastating weapon that he had no doubt would be used to try and destroy 
the Jewish nation, a holocaust in the flick of an eye.  Begin approached the 
issue not only in practical terms, but from a passionately emotional and 
ideological stance.51 
 Once Begin issued the strike order, timing became the next item of concern.  
According to Major General David Ivry, then Chief of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), “we 
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have to attack before uranium was going to get to the facility, because otherwise, after 
attacking with uranium inside, it can cause radiation damage to the environment.”52  
Israeli officials were concerned over the potential of nuclear fallout from the destruction 
of the reactor blowing into populated areas of Iraq and the danger to the Iraqi people.  
Although, a consensus was reached, the Israeli intelligence community recommended 
canceling the operation due to the potential of disrupting the Israeli peace negotiations 
with Egypt hours before the strike was to commence.53  Begin ignored this 
recommendation and ordered that the attack proceed.  On 7 July 1981 at 5:35pm, eight F-
16s dropped sixteen tons of explosives on the Osirak reactor.54   
3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
 The destruction of the Osirak reactor greatly affected Iraq’s nuclear program.  
Although the attack took Iraq off the fast track to nuclear weapon, Iraq responded with a 
furious response of doubling its efforts to obtaining the bomb.  It assigned 20,000 people 
to work on the nuclear program and pressed on with the development of gas centrifuges 
to produce bomb-grade material.  It spent over $10 billion on prohibited components and 
its denial and deception methods to conceal related facilities and technologies.55   
 While the United States publicly denounced the Israeli assault, one of the major 
controversies associated with the attack was the involvement of U.S. manufactured 
equipment as a delivery system for the operation.  The F-16s were sold to Israel to serve 
defensive purposes only.  Their use in an offensive, unprovoked attack upset the Iraqis 
and the entire Arab world, and was a violation of the United States Arms Export Control 
Act.56  The U.S. Congress reviewed a report citing the violation, but little was done to 
rectify it.  The United States, although embarrassed by Israel’s violation, maintained their 
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support for Israel regardless of the protests made by Iraq and other Arab states.57   It was 
later revealed that the United States provided targeting intelligence prior to the attack and 
bomb damage assessment assistance to the Israelis immediately following the strike.  
Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, initiated a secret agreement with the 
Israelis to obtain their promise to not challenge the U.S. sale of the Airborne Warning 
Control Systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia in exchange for target information on Iraq’s 
Osirak nuclear reactor outside of Baghdad.58   
An American KH-11 Big Bird photo reconnaissance satellite was diverted 
from its customary orbit over the Soviet Union and China; and within six 
hours, Israeli intelligence was getting KH-11 photos direct by satellite 
revealing the destruction wrought on the Iraqi plant.59 
 Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA, discovered that the 
intelligence information far exceeded the requirements of the raid.  Israel drew material 
from U.S. intelligence sources on Libya and Pakistan, and in response the U.S. 
intelligence community imposed a 250-mile limit on satellite information shared with 
Israel.60 
 The destruction of the Osirak reactor proved detrimental to Iraq’s nuclear 
program, and the Israelis maintained that it deferred the technology and material 
acquisition for a usable weapon by a decade.  Former United Nations chief nuclear 
weapons inspector David A. Kay estimated that if Iraq had been left undisturbed, it could 
have acquired a nuclear bomb by 1992.61  The Iraqi rationale behind pursing the bomb 
was split between Iraq’s hatred for Israel and the U.S. support to Israel. Thus, the 
question of the legitimacy of the preventive strike against Iraq comes into question.  The 
Israelis determined the Iraqi nuclear program a risk to Israel’s national security and acted 
accordingly to protect its sovereignty.  The implications that arose by the subsequent U.S. 
involvement in the situation led to greater tensions in U.S. / Iraqi relations.  It is quite 
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possible that if the Iraqis had gained nuclear weapons, they may have acquired additional 
provinces from Iran, Kuwait, and directly assaulted Israel.  So, in this situation preventive 
action did work, but the detrimental effects to relations with Iraq and the Arab world 
caused greater problems later for the United States. 
D. CASE STUDY 3: CHINA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE U.S. 
RESPONSE 
1. Background 
 China detonated its first nuclear devise on 20 October 1964.  The fact that China 
conducted the test earlier than the United States expected, left the Johnson administration 
wondering how to address the new Chinese Communist nuclear threat.  Months earlier, 
however, a wave of interest in preemptive strikes against the Chinese nuclear program 
circulated around the White House and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Declassified 
documents released in the mid-1990s, revealed that a U.S. preemptive attack on China’s 
nuclear plants was considered as a possible operation to disrupt the Chinese program.  
 China’s nuclear program first began in January 1955.  As a result of the lessons 
learned from the Korean War, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait, China decided to 
modernize its military and weapons to protect its sovereignty and power.  Mao Zedong’s 
rationale for a nuclear program centered on destroying the nuclear domination of China’s 
adversaries. China sought to gain status as a world power, while reducing U.S. power and 
influence in Asia and the Western Pacific.  China also desired to seize the leadership of 
the Communist movement from the Soviets.62  With this mindset, the Chinese set out to 
build their own nuclear program to compete against the perceived antagonism from the 
United States and its other enemies.  By 1958, Mao Zedong thoroughly believed that 
without atom and hydrogen bombs, “others don’t think what we say carries weight.”63 
 The U.S. intelligence community had little information regarding the Chinese 
nuclear program.  There was a great deal of secrecy surrounding the program and no 
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public announcements were made when the research institutes were opened.  Even the 
facilities associated with research and production were referred to by code names or 
numbered titles.64  But there were few information collection capabilities available for 
U.S. intelligence agencies.  Reconnaissance satellites were not launched until August 
1960, but the first valuable photographs of the Chinese nuclear program were not taken 
until 1961 – 1963, after the Chinese program was well underway.65  
 The U.S. intelligence community falsely analyzed that China used plutonium to 
manufacture their first bomb.  In actuality, however, the Chinese used uranium, which 
resulted in severe miscalculations by U.S. analyst in estimating when a usable devise 
would be ready for testing.  This belief continued throughout the early 1960s, and the 
analysts maintained that a detonation of a uranium device would not occur until well after 
the end of 1964.  The conclusion was that China would not have sufficient fissionable 
material to conduct a test and that the Lanzhou plant, responsible to for the production of 
uranium 235 was behind schedule.  Meanwhile, intelligence estimated that the Baotou 
plant that handled the plutonium production for China would not be capable of 
manufacturing enough material for a bomb until 1965.66  These perceptions tainted the 
interpretation of the images received by the Corona satellites that revealed the Lop Nor 
nuclear test stand and facility neared completion. On 26 August 1964, the CIA issued a 
top-secret statement regarding the intelligence estimates of a Chinese nuclear test.   
On the basis of new overhead photography, we are now convinced that the 
previously suspect facility at Lop Nor in Western China is a nuclear test 
site, which could be ready for use in about two months.  On the other hand 
the weight of available evidence indicates that the Chinese will not have 
sufficient fissionable material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few 
months.67 
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 Further inaccurate estimates regarding Chinese nuclear technology 
resulted when analysts used the timelines maintained by the United States and 
Soviet Union for their respective nuclear programs.   
The Soviet Union did considerably better, even though their technical base 
was widely believed to be inadequate to support such rapid progress.  The 
Chinese have a far weaker industrial base; but on the other hand many 
elements which were very difficult and expensive development for us (the 
United States) are now common knowledge or available on the open 
market.  Also they have shown greater willingness to sacrifice for high 
priority objectives.68 
Due to the failure of intelligence in collecting and analyzing information 
regarding the developing the Chinese nuclear program, President Johnson and his 
advisors were forced to make a decision without complete knowledge of the 
situation. 
2. The Decision Not to Attack 
 The Johnson administration knew the implications associated with a nuclear-
capable China and that consideration of action was necessary.  While the idea of a 
preventive attack circulated around the White House and the CIA, intelligence estimated 
the greater implications associated with a non-provoked attack on China, and determined 
them too costly.   
As the Chinese nuclear program got closer to fielding a testable device, in April 
1946, Special Assistant to the President, W.W. Rostow, issued a memorandum that 
addressed possible U.S. actions regarding the Chinese nuclear threat.  He stated that 
preemptive action “would be undesirable except as part of a military action against the 
response to major ChiCom [Chinese Communist] aggression.  Prospects for covert action 
should receive continued examination.”69  The memo discussed what military posture the 
United States should take in Asia in its entirety, and concluded that the U.S. “posture 
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should combine an implicit nuclear threat and a visible ability to deal conventionally with 
Communist aggression.  Emphasis should be given to dual-capable and seaborne 
forces.”70  It was apparent that maintaining a strong stance within Asia in its entirety was 
more important than specifically dealing with the Chinese nuclear threat.   
 By mid-September 1964, 6 weeks before the Chinese test, McGeorge Bundy, 
National Security Advisor to President Johnson, issued a memo declaring that “we are 
not in favor of unprovoked unilateral U.S. military action against Chinese nuclear 
installations at this time.  We would prefer to have a Chinese test take place than to 
initiate such action now.”  Bundy also stated that there was interest in pursuing a 
combined action with the Soviet Union against the Chinese nuclear threat.  He thought 
that warnings issued jointly by the United States and Soviet Union would be useful and 
that “even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action” would be a 
viable option if the Soviets were interested. The final determination on the matter was 
that further attempts to gather information regarding the Chinese nuclear facilities should 
be done in an aircraft with Chinese Nationalist [Taiwanese] markings and pilots to 
distract from U.S. involvement.  President Johnson approved this course of action and the 
issue of preventive strikes against the Chinese concluded.71  Earlier studies estimated that 
Soviet cooperation was improbable, and that since the “United States had not identified 
all of the relevant targets, an unprovoked attack would entail heavy foreign policy 
costs.”72  The Chinese threat could not “justify … actions which would involve great 
political costs or high military risks.”73 
3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
The official Chinese announcement after the detonation 16 October 1964 stated 
that it was “a major achievement” and China’s struggle to strengthen its defenses was 
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needed to “oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats.”74  
While the White House’s calmly reacted to the nuclear test, a debate continued over 
whether or not preventive strikes were the correct course of action.   
A commentary issued after the explosion by George W. Rathjens, an official with 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, revealed that the major flaw of the inaction 
strategy was the failure of intelligence to properly identify key targets and estimate the 
level of Chinese technology capabilities accurately. “In the light of reactions to the 
Chinese nuclear tests … it would appear that the political effects of the attainment of 
Chinese nuclear capabilities may also have been underestimated … further consideration 
of direct action against Chinese nuclear facilities may be warranted.”75  In addition, 
Rathjens realized that proper analysis of strategy in the nuclear age was ignored.  He 
stated that: 
A relatively small investment in offensive capability can make possible 
destruction of very great resources, and that it is all but inevitable that the 
time will come when relatively weak powers will be able to inflict very 
great and totally unacceptable damage on much stronger ones if they 
acquire nuclear capabilities modest by our [U.S.] standards.76 
As events occurred through the second half of the 1960s it was the Soviet Union, 
not the United States, which contemplated action against the Chinese nuclear threat, due 
to rising tensions along the Sino-Soviet border.  The United States was preoccupied with 
the Vietnam War to give much consideration to the Chinese nuclear threat.  As the Nixon 
administration came to power, the Chinese nuclear forces became useful to the United 
States as a deterrent against the Soviets and a balancing power within Asia.77 
Attempting preventive strikes against the Chinese nuclear program in 1964 would 
have alleviated future tensions; there was no guarantee that such action could completely 
destroy the ambitions of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist effort to build their 
own bomb.  Preemptive action would have required total destruction of all facilities and 
all personnel associated with the program and the Johnson administration deemed it 
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would be too costly and most likely unsuccessful.  With the U.S. preoccupation of 
containing the Soviet Union and the expanding war in Vietnam, issuing a lethal campaign 
against the Chinese nuclear program was not a top concern. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
 The use of preemptive and preventive strikes is a not suitable course of action for 
every WMD proliferating state.  There are many considerations that affect the outcome of 
an attack, but unfortunately, many of them cannot be determined until after the action has 
taken place.  The conditions surrounding each nuclear program can alter the perception of 
whether or not it was a successful operation and what the effects were after the action 
took place. 
 The fact that Great Britain was already at war with Germany while its nuclear 
program progressed made for no political barriers to preventive attack.  History books 
cite the costs of destroying the German nuclear program as necessary.  The attack on the 
Norsk-hydro plant presented a target of opportunity within the greater context of war. 
 The Israeli preventive attack on Osirak proved to be successful in slowing down 
the Iraqi nuclear program, but the United States, preoccupied by the AWACS sale to 
Saudi Arabia, failed to give full consideration to the effects that resulted from providing 
the Israelis intelligence to carry out the strike.  The action proved to be effective in 
securing Israeli national security, but the international community was disturbed by the 
aggressive nature with which Israel conducted the operation.   The events that followed 
the Osirak attack attracted greater interest by the U.S. government to the intentions of 
Iraq and Saddam Hussein.   
 The lack of action taken against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities may 
have been the best course of action for the time, given the other situations preoccupying 
U.S. foreign interests – containment of the Soviet Union and the growing U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam War.  Conducting a preventive action prior to the Chinese 
test would have involved a great deal of resources to ensure successful elimination of the 
Chinese nuclear technology, information, and scientists.  The United States decided to 
co-exist with a nuclear powered China and maintained this policy to the present day. This 
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policy however, is greatly supported by intelligence collection to maintain accurate 
estimates of Chinese intentions. 
 Using preemptive and preventive strikes within a counterproliferation policy is 
not an answer for every situation, but is effective when the conditions are right.  These 
conditions are dependent on reliable intelligence indicating the need for military action to 
take out a particular WMD-related target, determination that the benefits of taking action 
outweigh the costs of a preventive strike, and that the long term political consequences 
can be managed. Those ideal conditions appear to be when the world community has 
deemed other actions by the state unacceptable, as they were during the Second World 
War, or when an immediate direct threat against a state’s national security is established, 
as was case with the Israeli perception of Iraq’s nuclear program.   
 Preventive strikes can be a useful method of counterproliferation strategy because 
they offer a relatively quick response to counter an adversary’s developing WMD 
program.  Preventive strikes could be an effective course of action to disrupt Iran and 
North Korea’s WMD related facilities without specifically targeting the regimes in 
power.  While the post-strike political ramifications could be significant, they would be 
far more controllable than the implications of preventive war.  Intelligence remains a 
critical aspect of preventive strikes and must be precise to ensure the proper target(s) are 






 Interdiction, as a tool for counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), is potentially the least invasive and most proactive approach to the 
counterproliferation strategy.  It has been cited as a precept of U.S. strategy during 
several presidential administrations, but the strict guidelines associated with interdiction 
operations offer a reason why it has a limited success rate.  President George W. Bush’s 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction cited interdiction as a key 
component of the counterproliferation strategy. 
Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to 
combat WMD and their delivery means.  We must enhance 
the capabilities of our military, technical, and law 
enforcement communities to prevent the movement of 
WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states 
and terrorist organizations.78 
 
 While the intention to use interdiction, specifically maritime interdiction 
operations (MIO) has value, the details associated with the operational use of it are 
hindered by the intricacies of maritime law, the claim of states over territorial waters, the 
legality over seizing questionable materials, and the rights of states to engage in trade 
with other nations.  The mere fact that U.S. and allied warships can actively stop and 
board suspect ships creates a deterrent for the transportation of illicit materials on the 
high seas.  Many nations, however, continue to engage in the sea-going trade of materials 
associated with WMD, ballistic missiles, and dual-use technologies.     
 Conducting interdiction operations is a complicated task.  Even with the support 
of other nations, the legal process of boarding ships and obtaining precise intelligence on 
the cargo and intended recipient of the materials, offers a loophole which WMD 
proliferators can exploit.  The CIA estimated that Iraq earned about $3 billion in 2002 -- 
more than four times the 1998 amount -- by illegally exporting oil outside UN 
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authorization.79  In 1999 the United States, as a participant in the UN maritime 
interdiction force to enforce UN resolution 661, queried “some twenty-four hundred 
vessels, boarded approximately seven hundred, and diverted nineteen” to other ports.80  
North Korea, one of the world’s largest weapons proliferators, transports many types of 
weapons materials, as well as and fully functioning weapon systems to various nations 
across the globe.  In December 2002, a North Korean shipment of Scud missiles was 
seized aboard a ship off the coast of Yemen and subsequently released because there was 
no legal basis for the seizure.  This proves that the intent of interdiction has promise in 
countering WMD proliferation, but legal barriers hinder its effectiveness.  This chapter 
will review the challenges involved in maritime interdiction and examine the seizure of 
North Korean weapons bound for Yemen as a particular case study that highlights the 
problems the United States and its allies face in intercepting WMD materials at sea. 
B. CHALLENGES OF INTERDICTION AND MARITIME LAW 
Although maritime law provides the guidelines for the interception of ships 
engaged in piracy, interdiction of WMD is never mentioned.  The legality of seizing 
illicit cargo transported over the high seas is left to interpretation by legal professionals, 
individual states, and international governing bodies.  In principle, vessels sailing in 
international waters are under no obligation to follow a nation’s laws except the laws of 
the nation in which the vessel is flagged.  According to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the right of approach and visit of a vessel is permitted under international law by 
a “warship, military aircraft, or other duly authorized ship or aircraft [which] may 
approach any vessel in international waters to verify its nationality … it may be stopped 
boarded, and the ship’s documents examined, provided there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that it is: 
- Engaged in piracy 
- Engaged in the slave trade 
- Engaged in unauthorized broadcasting 
- Without nationality 
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- Flying a foreign flag, or refusing to show its flag, when the vessel is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.”81 
 
 Under the laws of the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), all merchant ships sailing the high seas trade must carry the flag of their 
respective nation.  If a vessel is sailing without an identifiable flag it is then is subject to 
radio signals by authorized warships to determine its nationality and if there is reasonable 
ground to believe the vessel is involved in illegal trade, they may be boarded.  There are 
other methods to determine the nationality of vessels.  All merchant vessels authorized 
for international trade have a number assigned to it by the IMO, an international radio 
call sign, and the name of the ship and its home port painted on the stern of the ship.82  
While the identification of merchant ships is relatively easy to determine upon the high 
seas, the contents of its cargo can only be inspected upon violation of the above stated 
guidelines, or when authorized by UN security resolution. 
 Conducting interdiction operations also entails the determination of the limits of a 
state’s territorial waters.  Maritime interdiction must be conducted on the high seas or in 
the territorial waters of the interdicting nation.  “Every state has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles.”83  While 
most states adhere to this policy, others use them to engage in illegal activities.  Official 
UN documentation states that Iran’s territorial waters in the Persian Gulf extends twelve 
nautical miles,84 however, it was common practice during the UN economic sanctions 
against Iraq that Iraqi vessels often traversed into Iranian waters to escape U.S. 
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inspections.85  This is done in part to ward off U.S. and coalition ships in the area and to 
protect their shipping trade from inspection.  Vessels of other nations can also share in 
this protection provided they gain Iranian authorization to sail within their territorial 
waters.  This presents a unique challenge for interdiction operations within the Persian 
Gulf region, since Iran has a large shipping industry and is one of the world’s top 
proliferators of WMD.  Coalition warships responsible for the tracking and interception 
of smuggled materials are then unable to stop suspect vessels at the point of origin 
because crossing the fifteen-mile line would generate unwanted diplomatic problems.     
C. CASE STUDY: SEIZURE OF NORTH KOREAN CARGO BOUND FOR 
YEMEN 
1. Background 
 On 9 December 2002, Spanish naval forces stopped a merchant vessel 600 miles 
south of Yemen under the suspicion that the ship carried illicit cargo.  The freighter failed 
to fly a national flag and the registration markings required by maritime law had been 
painted over, rendering it a stateless, lawless vessel, and thereby authorizing an 
inspection of the ship.  
 Spanish Defense Minister, Federico Trillo, announced during a press conference 
in Madrid that the Spanish frigate Navarra fired three bursts of warning shots at the cargo 
vessel after it tried to evade the warship and ignored requests for identification. Spanish 
snipers shot out metal cables crisscrossing the deck to allow a helicopter to hover 
overhead while seven armed marines were lowered down to the freighter. The freighter's 
crew offered no resistance. A second Spanish team then came aboard.  A search of the 
ship, which had last docked in China, turned up 15 Scud missiles, with 15 conventional, 
high-explosive warheads and 23 tanks of nitric acid, all covered by sacks of dry cement. 
Eighty-five barrels of unidentified chemicals were also found on board.86  Trillo said the 
ship was then handed over to the U.S. Navy for further inspection and seizure.   
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 U.S. intelligence followed the freighter Sosan since its departure from North 
Korea.  The master of the ship said during questioning that the vessel was from 
Cambodia.  A U.S. official stated that the Cambodian government informed the United 
States that they were unsure of the ship’s flagging, but did approve of the boarding and 
inspection.87  Upon further investigation of the ship’s logbooks, officials determined that 
Yemen was the scheduled destination for the illicit cargo.  The ship was detained in 
international waters until a decision was reached as to where the ship should be diverted. 
2. The Decision to Release 
 Upon review of the operation, the Bush administration determined that although the 
interdiction was legal under the guidelines of maritime law, neither North Korea nor Yemen 
violated any treaties with the missile sale. The White House initially worried that the Scud 
missiles were headed for Iraq.  U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney tried to persuade President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh of Yemen to give up delivery of the missiles, the same kind Yemen bought from 
North Korea before. 88  Given Yemen’s stature as a crucial Arab partner in the U.S. led war 
on terror, concessions had to be made to maintain the much-needed cooperation with the 
Yemeni government.  Yemen maintained that the Scuds were for defensive purposes only 
and the Sosan carried the final shipment of an old order.  Yemeni officials therefore 
demanded the missiles be handed over and the Bush administration complied under the 
guarantee that the missiles were not to be transferred to any other state or organization 
and that no further missile technology sales would be arranged with North Korea.  The 
release of the missiles to Yemen troubled the White House because U.S. intelligence 
agencies believed North Korea uses the hard currency from sales of its Scud and Nodong 
missiles to pay for both its missile program and its effort to develop nuclear weapons.89   
3. Implications and Lessons Learned 
 Even with the dissatisfying outcome, the seizure of the North Korean missiles had 
one redeeming effect: “America can detect clandestine arms shipments and, with its 
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allies, stop them at sea.”90  The incident proved that North Korea is proliferating missile 
technology and illustrated how the Bush administration can avoid alienating nations, like 
Yemen, deemed vital to its counterterror campaign.91  Some international lawyers say 
legal papers could have been used in an attempt to detain the ship indefinitely. Since the 
vessel was not flying a national flag, the vessel could have been held until its last legal 
owner claimed it.  In this case, Cambodia could have offered permission to destroy the 
cargo or insist the cargo be locked up, since it was shipped under false manifest.92  
Employing such tactics, however, would have generated further problems requiring 
diplomatic efforts between the United States, Yemen, North Korea, and Cambodia, and 
would have strained alliances or on-going nonproliferation negotiations.  The deciding 
factor was the importance of Yemen as a partner in the war on terror.  It was the hunt for 
Al Qaeda that actually made the seizure possible in the first place. During the war in 
Afghanistan, the United States organized coalition patrols in and near the Arabian Sea to 
stop terrorists from escaping to uncontrolled regions in the Horn of Africa.93 
 The release of the unmarked ship and the missiles was an embarrassing 
diplomatic end to an otherwise successful military interdiction of North Korean missiles. 
The timing of the seizure coincidently occurred on the day the Bush administration sent 
Congress the new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction document, 
that promotes the U.S. strategy of interdiction of WMD and associated technology. 
 
D. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
 As a result of the North Korean interdiction scandal and the on-going problems 
associated with international intelligence sharing for effective interdiction, President 
George W. Bush called for the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in 
Poland on 31 May 2003.94  The initiative obtained support from eleven countries - 
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the 
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United Kingdom, and the United States – and its primary focus is preventive interdiction.  
The function of the PSI is to detain and search ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of 
carrying WMD-related material to and from countries of "proliferation concern" (in 
particular, North Korea and Iran), as soon as they enter member countries' territory, 
territorial waters, or airspace.  It also encourages member countries to deny over-flight 
rights to suspicious aircraft or ground them when they stop to refuel.95     
 Asia, the Middle East and Europe, are the primary surveillance areas for the 
initiative, but debate continues over how much legal authority this plan has.  U.S. 
officials claim that international law provides sufficient room to conduct the necessary 
operations, and all that it needed is further international coordination and enforcement.  
As of early August 2003, the Bush administration had no plans to seek UN Security 
Council approval for the Proliferation Security Initiative, but “will operate under the 
‘inventive use of national laws,’ rather than attempt to re-write existing international law, 
which prohibits stopping vessels on the high seas or grounding aircraft in international 
airspace.”96   
 International law is likely to be a hindrance to the implementation of the initiative. 
UN approval may then be required, a process the United States is less than confident 
about.  Aside from settling the legal issues, the success of the PSI depends in large part 
on the implementation of logistics dictating what member country will assume 
responsibility for operations, decisions regarding economic funding for global operations, 
and the support and participation of critical nations such as China and Russia. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 Interdiction offers a promising course of action to take against the transfer of 
weapons of mass destruction on the high seas, but it fails to be a reliable method for all 
situations.  The successes of interdiction are often classified, but the failures are what 
signify the problems and challenges that face the strategy.  The implementation of 
interdiction into the counterproliferation strategy should be encouraged and the military 
services should continue their efforts, but the legal issues and challenges associated with 
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conducting maritime intercept operations need to be settled before interdiction can be 
adopted as a dependable practice.  
 The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to the United 
States and the international community, and intercepting associated materials before they 
have a chance to contribute to a state’s WMD program is an effective way to manage the 
proliferation problem.  Determining how, when, and what dual-use technologies and fully 
functioning weapons are being transferred is the primary challenge facing U.S. and allied 
interdiction operations.  With the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
the issues of information sharing could be alleviated, but the debate over international 
law and regulations will continue to hinder interdiction operations.  A review by the 
International Maritime Organization will be required at some point to declare the efforts 
of the PSI legitimate, since it is the internationally accepted governing body regarding 
laws of the sea. 
 North Korea, and other proliferating nations will continue to evade inspections 
and attempt to circumvent the internationally accepted laws of the sea.  While allied 
forces may prove successful in some instances of interdiction, weapons and associated 
materials of WMD can still slip through the intelligence, interdiction, and inspection 
process. Policy makers should continue to apply interdiction in the counterproliferation 
strategy because the practice of tracking and monitoring suspect ships can generate 
valuable intelligence for future use even if the cargo cannot be captured.  Interdiction is 
an appropriate and necessary action to counter the proliferation of WMD, but the 




 Preventive war and preemptive actions are unpredictable and unreliable 
counterproliferation strategies, but in some instances they provide possible alternatives to 
address the growing proliferation threat.  The National Security Strategy and National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction published by the Bush administration 
in 2002 set an aggressive policy to address the global problem of weapons of mass 
destruction counterproliferation.  The strategies prescribed in the documents, preemption, 
preventive war, preventive strikes, and interdiction, are not necessarily viable courses of 
action for every situation.  The Bush administration promoted preemptive and preventive 
action as a necessary course in defeating the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, but in practice, preventive war, preventive strikes and interdiction have 
limited utility as instruments of U.S. policy.   
 The National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction documents, while purposeful in their intent to portray the United States 
as a nation unwilling to proceed with strategies of the past, have raised important 
questions regarding their legality, and strained relations between the U.S and its allies.  
Because of these concerns, implementing these tools into a successful operational 
strategy is difficult.  As was seen in the case studies analyzed in the previous chapters, 
the geopolitical conditions and legal concerns associated with each case were important 
in determining the necessity of preventive action.  Only post-operation analysis could 
determine the true success or failure of the operations. 
 Preventive war is not a quick solution to an emerging threat. Clear political and 
military objectives for war must be addressed prior to commencement of hostilities. The 
primary objective of a preventive war is destruction of a state’s WMD capabilities, but 
may also include the removal of the attacked state’s leadership from power.  The military 
capabilities of the adversary, specifically the potential for retaliation, must be analyzed in 
order to weigh the cost of the war against the removal of the WMD threat. Precise 
intelligence on the adversary’s WMD capability is essential in order to strike before it 
reaches operational status. 
48 
 After the Second World War, the United States feared the emergence of a nuclear 
powered Soviet Union, because of its geographical size, its military, its influence on 
Europe, and its potential to spread communist ideals across the globe.  The question of 
whether or not to engage in a preventive war against the Soviet Union resulted in political 
debate over the viability of dismantling not only the Soviet nuclear program, but also the 
communist regime.   Through the persuasion of a few key individuals in the U.S. State 
Department and White House, the strategy of containment prevailed over preventive 
military action.  Although the United States expected the Soviet Union to crumble under 
its own misguided leadership, it took far longer than initially estimated.  Thirty years of 
Cold War, under threat of mutually assured destruction, and peripheral international 
hostilities resulted from the containment strategy.  
 The United States implemented a containment strategy once again in 1991, with 
the goal of dismantling the emerging WMD programs of Iraq and the Saddam Hussein 
regime.  After repeated violations of UN Security Resolutions and growing suspicions 
that Iraq was close to developing a usable nuclear weapon, the Bush administration 
determined that preventive war was the only alternative to thwart the future nuclear 
threat.  Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and removed the Saddam Hussein 
regime.  The challenges that followed the war, however, proved to be more significant 
than the operational objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power.  Failures to 
immediately identify Iraq’s WMD materials and to institute a stable new government 
both challenge the claim that preventive war was necessary.   
Preventive strikes, present a different set of operational objectives than preventive 
war.  Specific targeting of a state’s WMD, more specifically nuclear, facilities offers less 
operational challenges because their intent is not to remove the government from power, 
but only to remove the future threat of nuclear weapons.  Preventive strikes, when 
conducted in the proper geopolitical environment, can be an effective tool in the 
counterproliferation strategy.  Determining post-strike implications is difficult, but a 
successful mission can alleviate an impending threat and possibly allow other methods of 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation to work in the future.   
 During the Second World War, while the United States was preoccupied with the 
Manhattan Project, the Great Britain took the lead in dismantling the German nuclear 
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program.  Intelligence indicated that the Nazi nuclear program relied on the research 
conducted at the Norsk-Hydro heavy water plant in Norway.   The four preventive strike 
operations conducted by the allies succeeded in eliminating the German supply of heavy 
water required for its nuclear research program.  Although the allies eventually 
succeeded, the methods used to destroy the program were only justified because they 
were part of an ongoing larger war.  
 When Israel determined that Iraq’s nuclear program posed a great threat to its 
national security, it ordered a preventive strike against the Osirak reactor.  While the 
mission was successful in destroying the reactor and postponing Iraq’s nuclear 
capabilities for many years, the international criticism that followed the attack proved 
detrimental to Israeli foreign relations.  The strike was initially perceived to be a 
preemptive attack, indicating the Iraqi nuclear threat was so severe, that it required an 
immediate response to alleviate the threat.  It was later determined that the strike was 
preventive in nature and that the Iraqi nuclear program was years away from building a 
usable weapon.   
 During the early 1960s, the Johnson administration was confronted with the threat 
of a nuclear communist China.  Some U.S. officials pushed for preventive strikes against 
the Chinese nuclear facilities, but precise intelligence on their locations, operations, and 
timeline for testing was minimal.  President Johnson’s cabinet members determined 
preventive strikes were not a good strategic option, because the United States could cope 
with a nuclear-powered China.  The United States later realized the nuclear threat from 
China was a valuable deterrent against the Soviet Union.   
Interdiction is the least destructive method of counterproliferation strategy, but 
the legal barriers associated with international trade, and the intricacies of maritime law 
provide many challenges to its successful operational implementation.  The intention to 
halt WMD materials and dual-use technologies before they reach operational status is 
admirable, but the complexities of the interdiction process are the greatest hindrance to its 
success.  The interdiction of North Korean missiles by vessels of the Spanish and U.S. 
Navies demonstrated the potential of this strategy, but legal and political issues forced the 
release of the illicit cargo to its destination in Yemen.  Even with the development of the 
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Proliferation Security Initiative, the effectiveness of interdiction will remain limited until 
international trade and transportation laws are altered.  
The current threat WMD threat from Iran and North Korea poses a great deal of 
risks, however, limited uses of preventive action could have some value in eliminating 
those threats.  While the U.S. military has the strength to win a preventive war, initiating 
one against Iran or North Korea would not be a wise option and would involve greater 
challenges militarily and politically than was seen during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both 
states have stronger militaries, better conventional weapons and may use the preventive 
attack as an excuse to target neighboring states.  Therefore, international support would 
be essential in both cases.  A ground war in North Korea would include a long difficult 
process to remove Kim Jong Il from power.  Preventive war in Iran would disrupt the 
gradual and delicate political uprisings led by the dissatisfied public to overthrow the 
Islamic fundamentalist regime currently in power.  This process should be allowed to 
mature, but the WMD threat should not be ignored.  Preventive strikes pose the best 
option in addressing the WMD threat from Iran and North Korea, depending on the 
immediacy of the threat.  Open source reporting indicates a strong collection drive for 
information on both country’s’ WMD related targets.  Precise intelligence could make a 
preventive strike effective in disabling their WMD programs.  Interdiction operations 
should continue to track suspect vessels and cargo in and out of the Persian Gulf and 
throughout the Pacific in order to gain further information on Iranian and North Korean 
proliferation efforts, even if illicit cargo cannot be seized under international law.  
The purpose of preventive war, preventive strikes, and interdiction within the 
current U.S. counterproliferation strategy is to present to the world that the previous 
methods used to curb WMD proliferation failed and that a more aggressive approach was 
needed.  Each technique has value in the overall strategy, but these aggressive 
counterproliferation methods cannot be used against every adversary attempting to 
acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.   
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